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SECTION ONE

FIRST DAY
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Roanoke, Virginia
July 27, 1976

1.
On Hay 23, 1975, Janet Knox filed her motion for judgment
in the Circuit Court of the City of Danville against Timothy Turner,
seeking damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received
by her as the result of a collision between the automobile in which
she was a passenger, and a truck owned and operated by Turner, at an
intersection in Danville on January 22, 1975. The notice of motion
for judgment with a copy of the motion attached was duly served on
Turner on Nay 27, 19750
On June 10, 1975, the defendant filed in the United States
District Court for the i;·1estern District of Virginia, a petition and
bond for the removal of the case to that Court, claiming diversity
of citizenship. A copy of the petition was filed in the Clerk's
Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Danville, and notice of
the filing of the petition and bond was mailed to Janet Knox 1 s attorney on June 10, 1975, all in accordance with the Federal statute.
On June 21, 1975, the defendant Turner filed in the United States
District Court his answer to the motion for judgment. A copy of this
answer was mailed to Janet Knox's attorney, and a copy mailed to and
filed by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of Danvilleo
Thereafter, by order entered by the United States District
Court on August 8, 1975, the case was remanded to the Circuit Court
of the City of Danville on the ground there was no diversity of citizenship. A copy of the order remanding the case was received and
filed in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Danville on August 10, 19750
On August 20, 1975, the Circuit Court of the City of Danville, on motion of the plaintiff Janet I<nox, and without notice to
the defendant, awarded judgment in her favor by default and fixed
August 27, 1975, as the date for hearing evidence to determine the
amount of damages. After hearing evidence on the matter of damages,
the Court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff Janet Itnox for
$12,500.

Upon learning that judgment had been granted, the attorney
for Timothy Turner filed a motion to set aside the default judgment
on September 2, 1975, asserting that the Court erred in entering judgmC>nt by default, and in hearing evidence as to damages without notice,
since he (Turner} had filed his answer to plaintiff's motion for judgm'2nt in the Unib~d States District Court within 20 days from the filing of the petition and bond for the removal of the case to that Court.
T-Jhat should have been the ruling of the Court on
Turner's motion to set aside the default judgment?

Page Two
2.
Acme Casualty Company, a Delaware Corporation with its principal office in ~'lilmington, Delaware, executed as surety a performance
bond,, with Caldwell, a contractor and citizen of Virginia, as principaL The bond ran in favor of the Town of tvise as obligee on a contract which Caldwell held with the Town for construction of a new municipal building which was to be completed by r.1ay 1, 1975. Caldwell
encountered financial difficulties and defaulted on the partially completed contract in January of 19 75. As the result, .Acme paid the Town
$150,000 covering the cost of completing the contract.
Acme filed a complaint in the u. s. District Court for the
Western District of Virginia on September 1, 1975, against Caldwell,
seeking reimbursement, pursuant to the terms of the bond, for the
$150,000 which it had been compelled to pay by reason of Caldwell's
default. The trial of this case resulted in a judgment in favor of
Acme against Caldwell.
On May 2, 1976, Caldwell filed a complaint against Acme in
the Uo S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, the
first count of the complaint seeking the recovery of $10,500 on the
ground that Acme had made an overcharge in this amount on the bond
premium previously paid by Caldlvell, and the second count seeking recovery of $300,000. for damages to Caldwell's reputation and credit resulting from certain alleged slanderous and malicious threats made by
Acme during June of 1975, in an attempt to force Caldwell to properly
perform his contract.
Acme filed a motion to dismiss both counts of the complaint
on the ground that Caldwell was precluded from asserting such claims
since he did not do so in the prior action.
How should the Court rule on the motion as to
(a) the count seeking the recovery of the alleged premium overcharge; and (b) the count
seeking recovery for damages on account of the
alleged slanderous and malicious conduct?
3.
Thomas Andrews was being tried in the Circuit Court of Bland
County on an indictment charging him with armed robbery. Hhen the Commonwealth and the defendant had both rested their cases, the Court took
a recess and the Judge and counsel entered the Judge's chambers for the
purpose of considering the instructions. There, the instructions were
argued at length and the Court, by proper notation on each instruction
offered, indicated the instructions which would be granted and refused.
All this was done in the absence of the defendant and without any objection from his attorney.
Thereafter, the Court reconvened and, in the presence of
Andrews, the Court read to the jury the instructions which it had decided to grant. The Commonwealth's Attorney and the attorney for
Andrews then presented their arguments to the jury, after which it re-
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tired to deliberate. While deliberating, the foreman sent a message
to the Judge asking that the ju~y be allowed to hear the testimony of
one Billips, a man one of the witnesses had testified was present at
the time of the alleged offense. Upon receiving this message, the
.trial Judge advised the Commonwealth's Attorney and Andrews' attorney
of the jury's request, and, after discussing the matter with the attorneys, sent a written message to the jury which read as follows:
"You must base your verdict upon the evidence and
the instructions before you."
Andrews was not present ·when the message from the jury \·1as
received by the Judge, or during the subsequent discussion between the
Court and the attorneys, or when the message from the Court was dispatched to the jury, and no objection was made to this procedure by
Andrews' attorney.
After the jury had returned a verdict of guilty, and fixed
Andrews' punishment at ten years in the penitentiary, his attorney
moved the Court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the
ground that Virginia Code § 19.2-259 provides that "A person tried for
a felony shall be personally present during the trial***. 0
The Commonwealth's Attorney resisted the motion on the following grounds:
(a) The consideration of instructions in chambers did not
constitute a part of the trial.
(b) The message from the jury to the Court and the Court's
reply to the jury did not constitute a part of the trial.
(c) In any event, the failure of Andrews' attorney to object to either procedure prior to the verdict constituted a waiver of
the statutory requirement.
What should be the Court's ruling on each of the
positions advanced by the Commonwealth's Attorney?
4.
On May 30, 1975, John Hare filed a motion for judgment
against Harry Fox in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County, seeking
damages for personal injuries received in an automobile accident which
had occurred in Botetourt County on Barch 3, 1975.
Process, consisting of the notice and a copy of the motion
for judgment, was issued and placed in the hands of the Sheriff of
Botetourt County for service, who made his return on June 5, as follows:
"Not executed. Harry Fox could not be
found within my bailiwick.
{S) Joseph Doakes, Sheriff of Botetourt County"
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Upon investigation, Harry's attorney l.earned that Fox had
obtained employment at an automobile plant in Detroit and had moved
from his home in Botetourt County to that City. Knowing that Fox had
a number of relatives residing in Botetourt County of whom he was very
fond and would likely visit from time to time, Hare and his attorney
decided that they would be on the alert for such visits and have Fox
served with the process on some occasion while in Botetourt County
visiting relatives. Fox did return to Botetourt County for a visit
with relatives on July 20, 1976, at which time the process was served
upon him in person by the Sheriff of Botetourt County.
Fox consults you and seeks your advice as to whether he is
bound by the service made by the Sheriff.
t'Jhat should you advise?
So
Allen Allenby owned a tract of land in Nelson County, Virginia contiguous to a farm owned and operated by Stephen Squires.
The Squires f arrn was at the intersection of a primary and secondary
road Nhile the Allenby property fronted only on the secondary roadway.
There was, however, an old roadway across a portion of the Squires
property by which Allenby could reach the primary road. Allenby contended that this was a public road'i.vay over which he was entitled to
travel. Squires disagreed and filed a suit in the Circuit Court of
Nelson County seeking a declaratory judgment decreeing that there was
no public roadway, and that instead, he, Squires, was the fee simple
owner.of the property allegedly occupied by such roadway and could
close the roadway at.will. The matter was referred to a Commissioner
in Chancery who heard the witnesses ore tenus. During the hearing
there was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether and to what
extent any public road officials had worked on the roadway, which the
Commissioner believed to be the controlling issue under the applicable
statute. At the conclusion of the hearina the Commissioner filed his
report making certain factual findings and concluding that under the
applicable law no public roadway had been established.

Allenby filed timely exceptions to the Commissioner's report and the matter was argued before the Judge of the Circuit Court
sitting as Chancellor. After consideration of a transcript of the
evidence and argument of counsel, the Chancellor entered a decree
sustaining the exceptions to the Commissioner's report, and finding
that the evidence, viewed as a whole under applicable law, supported
his decision that a public roadway had been established_. Squires
then appealed, contending that the Chancellor was bound by the finding of the Commissioner because he alone had heard the witnesses
testify.
How should the Supreme Court rule on Squires'
contention?
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6.
Sadie Smith was a \r.1eal thy wi<lm·1 i·1ho resided in Richmond p
Virginia with a uinter borne in Paln ::leach, Florida. S!1e had three
sons: George, \1ho resided in Fairfa~c County, Virginia.; Sai11, who
lived in Chicago, Illinois; ond Fred, l.·1hose horae was in SaltLa.~e City,
Utah. Sh8 and George Oi:med, as joint tenar1ts ui th the right of survivorship, a tr.act of land in Helson County, Virginia. Confederate
Camp Corporation, of Franklin, Virginia becane interested in the
Nelson County acrcac;e·, determined that the title ~·ms vested in Sac..1ie
and George, and wrote George, Nho hac1 been paying the tax bills on
the property, inqniring as to uhGther he and his mother ~wuld sell
the property for :ns,ooo. Upon recGipt of tbe inquiry, George forwarded tlw letter to his mother, ~.·1ho at the ti::ic \\Tas vacationing in
Florida. He \'-Jrote to Confederate Car.-ip t~1at he llad for-rnrdcd the
letter to his mother, saying "she might he inter~sted in selling the
property. :- 1 Sac1ie tllen \·Jrote to Confe<lerate Camp saying she wanted
the advice of her sons and had 11 spoJ~cn to ead1 of my sons except Fred
and if Fred is agreea!)le we ·will sell for :;; 32, 503. You nay want to
contact Fred directly.
Confederate Cc..r:-!p then called Fred who said
it \·ms up to his mother and if she ~;as ac:Jreeable, he was sure it \1a3
all right wi tll all th·2 sons. Fred uls0 ':!rote his mother saying he
agreed to the sale. Confederate Ca:mn th8n tenc1erea. to Sadie a
written contract providing for a sale for $32, 500 q together with a·
$1,00'J bincler c:1eck.
Sadie acc0ptec1 the check and signe<l the contract for herself and Gcorse. !'ll~en the clGed •,;as prepared and submitted to George he refused to sign saying that the property was
worth ~50,000 at a·miniruum. Confederate Camp then brouqht suit
against SaC:ie Smith ancl. George for specific performance. George defended on the basis that he never nade any contract with the corporation, in response to which Confederate Canp asserted that Sadie had
bound George a3 his agent.
i;

'iJas George bound under the contract?
John Jones operated a delivery s~rvice in Charlottesville,
,.:P. i''as asked to deliver t·;:10 ~)acJ~agcs for Smelter anc~ Forge
Jewellers: One, a gold watch, to tl11; Dean of the Lm-.r School at the
University of Virginia; and the other, a crystal decanter to Paul
Brmm who lived in .l~~swick. John haa a 'Dae clay. :::::n route to the Law
School his car was involved in a mub1al fault collision at the intersection of Routes U. s. 29 anc1 25'1 u3 a rcsul t of which the glass decanter ,.ras shattered. 'Jhile he ~ras discu::rning tlic accident
th the
police, someone stole the other package from the car.
7.

V~rginia.

,.,i

Is John liable for
the two items?

th~

loss of either or both of

8.
In an action cor.mcnced in the Circuit Court of Pairfax
County, Virginia, ~Jilliam Thomas recovered a judgment-- against Jack
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Peterson in t!1c ar:i.ount of $15,000. Thomas consults you and seeks your
advice as to ~hether the judgwBnt is collectible. l...n investigation
reveals~ that Peterson ouno no property; that one year before Thomas
consulted you, Peterson had been struck by an automobile ovmed and
negligently operated by his brother, a man of consideraDle wealth;
that Peter3on sustained serious personal injuries; that Peterson had
not sued his b:i::other; and tllat Peterson stated many times that he
never would sue his brother for the injuries he sustained. After advising Thomas the results of the investigation, he asked you by what
means, if any, he may proceed against Peterson's ·wealthy brother to
effect collection of the judgm0nt that he obtained against Peterson.
What •110uld you advise?
9.
John Richman obtained a judgment against William Poorman in
the amount of $15,000, which judgment constituted a li~n on a farm,
known as "Greentree,~' owned by Poorman. On January 5, 1976, Richman
filed a bill in equity to enforce tho judgment lien against the farm
owned by Poorman. Poorman filed an answer to the bill of complaint
in which he admitted the averments therein contained, and for additional ans·...,er thereto he averred that William Pratt, John Bagley and
Thomas Baxter had, in that order, obtained judgment liens against
11
Greentree 11 prior to the date that Richnan had obtained his judgment.
After revie~1ing the bill of complai!1t and the answer filed by Poorman, the Chaacellor, over the objection of Poorman, entered an order
of reference on February 5th bv which the court directed a Master Commissioner in Chancery
ascertain and report~ the fair ma~ket value
of 11 Grecntree 11 ; the liens against "Greentree" and the order of their
priority/ and uhether the rents and profits from the operation of the
farm would be sufficient to pay the lien debts within five years. By
leave of court, over the objection of Poorman, Pratt, Bagley and
Baxter '!;lere permitted to and did file answers in the suit asserting
their liens on !:larch 15 3 1976. The Haster Commissioner, after hearing evidence, reported. on June 1: that "Greentree 1'I1ad a fair market
value of $30,000; that Pratt had obtained a judgment against Poorman
on .P.pril 10, 1974, for $10, 000, which constituted a lien on "Greentree:: 1 that Bagley had obtained a judgment against Poorman on ttlarch .
6, 1974, for $5,000, which constituted a lien on "Greentree"; that
Baxter had o°!:>t(;dned a judgment against J?oorman on march 10, 1956, for
$15,000; that Richman obtaineC: a judgment against Poorman on May 8,
197'1, for $15,000: and that the rents and profits from the operation
of the farm, within a period of five years, would not pay the lien
debts against the property. Thereafter Richman and Poorman, by leave
of court, each filed a plea of the statute of limitations to the claim
of ~homas Baxter. Also, Richman filed an exception to the Cornmissioner' s Report on the grounds (a) that the Court did not have authority,
over his objection, to refer the cause to a Baster Commissioner for
the pur:c>ose of ascertaining and reporting the liens and the order of
their priorities, (b) t~at his claim was entitled to prioity in payment because he had commenced the suit al'ld thereby obtained a prefer-

to
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ence, and {c) that the enfo!:'cement of the lien obtained by Baxter was
barred by the statute of li~i tations. Poorman filed an exception to
the Commissioner's Report on the ground that the lien obtained by
Baxter was barred by the statute of limitations.
How should the Court rule:
1. On Richman's o::.,jection to the entry of the order of
reference, and his exception to the Commissioner's Report on the
ground that the court lacJ:ed authority to enter the order of reference?
2. On Richman°s exception to the Coni.missioner's Report on
the ground that Richman had obtained a preference by commencing the
suit to enforce his lien?
3. On Richmanqs nlea of the statute of limitations, and
his ej-tception to the Commissioner's Report in reporting that Baxter's
lien had priority over tho.t of Richman?
~.
On Poorman's plea of the statute of limitations a,.~d
his exception to the Cormnissioner's Report in reporting that Baxter's
lien had priority over that of Richman?

10.
In 1964, Larry Livermore gave to his wife, Ida Livermore,
100 shares of the common stock of Livermore, Inc., a business corporation organized by Larry Livermoye. In June, 1974, Ida Livermore

com..rnenced a suit against her husband in the Circuit Court of Hanover
County, Virginia, chargi11g him with adultery. Larry Livermore tried
to effect a reconciliation with his wife, stoutly denying th2.t he 'vas
guilty of adultery. Failing in his attempt for a reconciliation, he
filed an answer denying the charges of adultery and he also filed a
cross bill charging his wife with desertion. Before the date set for
a hearing ~ tenus the parties and their attorneys met in an effort
to resolve their differences. As a result of this meeting a written
contract was entered into between the parties reciting that in consideration of the wifevs agreenent to assign and deliver to her husband the 100 shares of stock in Livermore, Inc., Larry Livermore
aryreed to dismiss ~is cross bill seeking a divorce on the grounds of
desertion. The <lay after the agreement was entered into by the parties, an order was entered dismissing Larry Livermore's cross bill
pursuant to a written motion filed in the cause by Larry Livermore.
Although !lis wife's bill of complaint was not dismissed and the
suit remained on t~1e docket, Ida Livermore, because of her health,
went to California one month after the cross bill was dismissed.
After remaining in California for the time required to give a California ·-:ourt jurisdiction she obtained a divorce from her husband on
the ground of mental cruelty. Shortly after obtaining the California
divorce I~a Livermore returned to Hanover county to visit her mother
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and, while visiting in that County, Larry Livermore filed a suit in
equity against her for the purpose of enforcing the contract and
raquiring her to transfer and assign and deliver to him the 100
shares of stock in Livermore, Inc. A cor;;iy of the written contract
'Nas filed with the bill of complaint. Ida Livermore filed a
demurrer to the .bill of complaint assigning as a ground of demurrer
that the contract was not supported by a valuable consideration and
was therefore unenforcG.able.
ilow should the Court rule on the demurrer?

